Rules and information: An integral criticism of legislation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v13i2.115Abstract
The goal of this paper is to produce a fundamental criticism of the legislation. However, to do so, we first need to understand the nature of custom-ary rules. For this task, we find it relevant to develop a rule theory founded on praxeology. This work studies how man produces claims over certain economic goods, how those claims can lead to conflict and the complex interactions that take place as a consequence of this. We will conclude that the rules produced in a free society as a result of said interactions condense relevant information that aids human coordination, propitiating a better resolution of future conflicts as well as their avoidance. Rules tell man what expectations he can rely on. Parting from this theory, we will explain how intervention on this spontaneous process by way of legislation produces critical consequences which we can only understand after acknowledging the process of rule formation.
Keywords: praxeology, law, customary law, rules, expectations, spontaneous order, entrepreneurship, legislation.
JEL codes: K0.
Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es producir una crítica fundamental de la legislación. Sin embargo, para hacerlo, primero tenemos que comprender la naturaleza de las normas consuetudinarias. Para esta tarea, consideramos que es relevante el desarrollo de una teoría de reglas basada en la praxeología. Este trabajo estudia cómo el hombre genera reclamaciones sobre ciertos bie-nes económicos, cómo ellas pueden conducir a un conflicto y las complejas interacciones que se producen como consecuencia de ello. Llegaremos a la conclusión de que las reglas que se producen en una sociedad libre y como resultado de dichas interacciones, condensan información relevante que ayu-da a la coordinación humana, propiciando una mejor resolución y evitación de conflictos futuros. Las reglas indican al hombre en qué expectativas puede confiar. A partir de esta teoría, vamos a explicar cómo la intervención en este proceso espontáneo a través de la legislación produce consecuencias críticas que sólo podemos entender después de reconocer el proceso de formación de reglas.
Palabras clave: praxeología, derecho, ley consuetudinaria, reglas, expectati-vas, orden espontáneo, función empresarial, legislación.
Clasificación JEL: K0.
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