Tullock’s Challenge: A Reconsideration of Constitutional Monarchy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v11i2.163Abstract
Tullock (2005, p. 160) notes that the perceived robust relationship between democracy and economic progress is due mostly to assumption, rather than analysis. Taking up Tullock’s challenge to consider the relationship bet - ween economic progress and other political forms, we re-assess the relation-ship between monarchy and economic progress. Our analysis specifically focuses on the possibility of a «monarchical» constitution creating the insti-tutions within which, compared to democracy, a larger social surplus can be enjoyed. After summarizing the existing conversation on monarchy vs. democracy, we outline a constitutional political economy of monarchy and apply it to the European country of Liechtenstein, which has enjoyed both rapid development and non-discriminatory governance under the kind of constitution we envision. We conclude by responding to anticipated objec-tions and proposing further avenues of inquiry on the political economy of monarchy.
Key words: Constitutional Political Economy, Democracy, Efficiency, Monarchy, Liechtenstein.
JEL Classification: H1, H77, P1.
Resumen: De acuerdo a Tullock (2005, p. 160) la sólida relación entre demo-cracia y progreso económico descansa más en supuestos que en análisis. Tomando el desafío de Tullock de considerar la relación entre progreso eco-nómico y diversas estructuras políticas, re-evaluamos la relación entre mo-narquía y progreso económico. Nuestro análisis se enfoca específicamente en la posibilidad de una «monarquía» constitucional que crea la instituciones en las cuales, comparado con una democracia, un mayor beneficio social es posible. Luego de resumir la conversación monarquía vs. democracia, pre-sentamos una política económica constitucional de la monarquía y la apli-camos al país europeo de Lichtenstein, que ha presentado un rápido desa-rrollo y una gobernanza no discriminatoria bajo el tipo de constitución que presentamos. Concluimos respondiendo a anticipadas objeciones y pro po - niendo siguientes caminos de investigación en el tema de la economía po-lítica de la monarquía.
Palabras clave: Economía Política Constitutional, Democracia, Eficiencia, Monarquía, Liechtenstein.
Clasificación JEL: H1, H77, P1.
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