An Introduction to Institutional Coordination as An Alternate Model for Neo-Institutional Economic Analysis

Authors

  • Rubén Méndez Reátegui Rubén Méndez R. is a researcher in the Department of Economics at Macquarie University in Sydney in Australia and visiting scholar at Complutense University of Madrid and Salamanca University in Spain

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v10i2.194

Abstract

In this paper, through the formulation of an alternate conceptual model, the author links the concepts of functional entrepreneurship and institutions, understood as a set of categories —formal and informal rules— showing a complex, dynamic and interactive character. Furthermore, the aim of this paper is to introduce an exploration of the concept of institutional coordination or positive institutional interaction as an essential element for neo institutional economics analysis. This aim proposes the hypothesis that institutional coordination or positive interaction among formal and informal institutions is the real key element for a theoretically consistent and com-prehensive analysis, evaluation and testing of institutions. Moreover, the paper is attached to the «meta» concept of society, represented as a process of dynamic collaboration among individuals. This assumption seeks to suggest an improved theoretical standard through the insertion of concepts taken from classical legal theory such as «desuetude» and «contra legem custom». This theoretical standard leads the author to introduce a set of contributions to the contemporary heterodox economics literature: a. Negative institutio-nal interaction is a process where overlapping and displacement between formal and informal rules cannot be leaved outside the model; b. A discussion in terms of institutional marginal rate of technical substitution becomes im-portant for deciding the best possible combination of formal and informal institutions; c. An exploration of the determinants for institutional elasticity, as the author assumes, that determinants of institutional elasticity mainly co-rrespond to the ease with which a «formal institution» can be replaced by an «informal institution» and vice versa; d. The use of the brain reward system and the Neuroscience approach introduced as a tool to improve the analysis of institutional coordination. Together the significance of these contributions brings a secondary hypothesis: traditional neo institutional analysis is weak, in the sense that, it avoids dealing with the real role and relevancy of in-formal institutions shouldering the prevalence of the formal institutional frame-work to reach institutional predictability and a sustainable social order. There-fore, the author claims that the traditional analysis is mistaken as it indirectly supports a separation and confrontation between contributions emerging from the legal abstract theory of the sources of law (Ghersi, 2007) and eco-nomic analysis.

Key words: Functional Entrepreneurship, Formal and Informal Rules, Institutional Coordination, Positive Institutional Interaction, Institutional Elasticity, Sources of Law.

JEL Classification: B52, K00, Z13.

Resumen: En este trabajo, mediante la formulación de un modelo conceptual, el autor vincula los conceptos de empresarialidad funcional e instituciones apuntando a presentar una exploración del concepto de coordinación institu - cional o interacción institucional positiva como elemento esencial para el análisis económico. El objetivo es introducir la hipótesis de que la coordina-ción institucional entre las instituciones formales e informales es el elemento clave a dilucidar con miras a completar la elaboración de una teoría de las instituciones más consistente. Esta dilucidación se expresa a través de las siguientes contribuciones: a) La interacción institucional negativa es un pro-ceso en el que los desplazamientos y sobre posiciones entre reglas formales e informales no pueden ser dejadas fuera del modelo; b) Una discusión de la relevancia y características de la tasa marginal de sustitución técnica en el ámbito de lo institucional —relevante sobre todo al momento de estimar la mejor combinación posible de las instituciones formales e informales—;

c) Una exploración de los determinantes de la elasticidad institucional —que se corresponderían con la facilidad con la que una «institución formal» puede ser sustituida por una «institución informal» y viceversa—; d) El uso del enfoque de Neurociencias y del sistema de recompensa del cerebro, los cuales son presentados como una herramienta para mejorar el análisis de la coordi-nación institucional.

Palabras clave: Empresarialidad Funcional, Reglas Formales e Informales, Coordinación Institucional, Interacción Institucional Positiva, Elasticidad Insti - tucional, Fuentes del Derecho.

Clasificación JEL: B52, K00, Z13.

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Published

2013-07-01

How to Cite

Reátegui, R. M. . (2013). An Introduction to Institutional Coordination as An Alternate Model for Neo-Institutional Economic Analysis. REVISTA PROCESOS DE MERCADO, 10(2), 151–197. https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v10i2.194

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