An Austrian Analysis of the Nazi Economic Recovery (1933-1939)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v8i1.268Abstract
Hitler came to power in 1933. By that time, the economic situation of Germany was critical: there were almost six million unem-ployed, prices were in a decreasing trend and production had reduced considerably. In other words, Germany was suffering the worst economic crisis of its history. The Nazi Party promised to solve this dramatic situation and the truth was that, after six years, the German economy reached full employment, the in-dustrial output doubled and the Government raised a strong army. This amazing development has always puzzled many historians. How did they achieve this? What was the secret of the Nazis? In opinion of many economists and historians the Nazi Recovery demonstrated the power of the State to overcome economic problems. Thus, according to this view, the State could solve even the worst economic crisis, if it applied the right policies. Is this view correct? Could we learn anything from this historical episode to overcome economic crises? Did the Nazis discover the secret of full employment? In this paper I will study the Nazi growth strategy and I will try to answer these questions. In the first part of this article, I will explain the concrete policies that were undertaken by the Nazi Government, in the second part I will analyze them and finally there will be a section with the main conclusions.
The German economy was severely hit by the Great Depression. During the second half of 1920’s there was a massive credit expansion process which brought about a huge boom that ended in a sharp depression.1 After four years of political and economic crisis, Hitler came to power and his main objectives were to solve this critical situation and to restore the national dignity. Beforehand, it is appropriate to look the evolution of the main macroeconomic magnitudes (Table 1).
As we can see, unemployment was reduced extremely quickly and at the same time real production increased. If we look in more detail, the industrial production doubled in this period. And what happened to prices? We can say that prices did not increase significantly: just 10% if we take the official prices and 20% if we trust John Klein’s estimations. It is not an exaggeration to say that any Prime Minister would like this economic development for his country. Let’s explain what policies they exactly undertook to achieve these results.
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