John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises on Probability
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v5i1.315Abstract
The economic paradigms of Ludwig von Mises on the one hand and of John Maynard Keynes on the other have been correctly recognized as antithetical at the theoretical level, and as antagonistic with respect to their practical and public policy implications. Characteristically they have also been vindicated by opposing sides of the political spectrum. Nevertheless the respective views of these authors with respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability exhibit a closer conceptual affinity than has been acknowledged in the literature. In particular it is argued that in some relevant respects Ludwig von Mises’ interpretation of the concept of probability exhibits a closer affinity with the interpretation of probability developed by his opponent John Maynard Keynes than with the views on probability espoused by his brother Richard von Mises. Nevertheless there also exist significant differences between the views of Ludwig von Mises and those of John Maynard Keynes with respect to probability. One of these is highlighted more particularly: where John Maynard Keynes advocated a monist view of probability, Ludwig von Mises embraced a dualist view of probability, according to which the concept of probability has two different meanings each of which is valid in a particular area or context. It is concluded that both John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig von Mises presented highly nuanced views with respect to the meaning and interpretation of probability.
JEL codes: B00; B40; B49; B53; C00.
Key words: General Methodology; Austrian Methodology; Keynesian Methodology; Quantitative and Qualitative Probability Concepts: Meaning and Interpretation; Frequency Interpretation; Logical Interpretation; John Maynard Keynes; Ludwig von Mises; Richard von Mises.
Resumen: Los paradigmas económicos de Ludwig von Mises por una parte, y de John Maynard Keynes por otra, han sido correctamente reconocidos como contradictorias a nivel teórico, y como antagonistas, con respecto a sus implicaciones políticas prácticas y públicas. Aún así, las respectivas visiones de estos autores con respecto al significado e interpretación de la probabilidad, muestra una afinidad conceptual más estrecha que los que se ha reconocido en la literatura. Se ha argumentado especialmente que en algunos aspectos importantes, la interpretación de Ludwig von Mises del concepto de probabilidad, muestra una más estrecha afinidad con la interpretación de probabilidad desarrollada por su oponente John Maynard Keynes, que con las maneras de ver la probabilidad respaldadas por su hermano Richard von Mises. Sin embargo, también existen grandes diferencias entre los puntos de vista de Ludwig von Mises y aquellos de John Maynard Keynes con respecto a la probabilidad. Uno de ellos destaca principalmente: cuando John Maynard Keynes aboga por un punto de vista monista de la probabilidad, Ludwig von Mises defiende un punto de vista dualista de la probabilidad, de acuerdo con el cual el concepto de probabilidad recibe dos significados diferentes, y en donde cada uno de ellos es válido en un área o contexto en particular. Se concluye que tanto John Maynard Keynes como Ludwig von Mises presentan puntos de vista claramente diferenciados con respecto al significado e interpretación de la probabilidad.
Códigos JEL: B00; B40; B49; B53; C00.
Palabras clave: Metodología General; Metodología austríaca; Metodología Keynesiana; Conceptos de probabilidad cuantitativos y cualitativos: Significado e Interpretación; Interpretación frecuencialista; Interpretación lógica; John Maynard Keynes; Ludwig von Mises; Richard von Mises.
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