¿Es posible la mano invisible?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.52195/pm.v16i1.40Abstract
One of the main contributions of economics to the social sciences, expressed in the famous metaphor of the “invisible hand”, ended up being questioned by a good part of the economists. Based on the assumption of an individual maximizer of monetary utility, the social cooperation in which it con- sists failed, and it was not possible to expect it to succeed. However, recent developments in various areas have provided new elements in favor of its pos- sibility, its sustainability over time, and its extension to larger groups. In this work we will consider the recent contributions related to this topic in Game The- ory, Experimental Economics, Evolutionary Psychology and the analysis of his- torical cases that help to elucidate the theory and confirm its concepts. It will be considered how these areas of the social sciences have contributed with new elements to the understanding of social cooperation and voluntary actions. It concludes by stating that the invisible hand failure should, at least, be ques- tioned, and that there is still a large field to be developed in the analysis of these spontaneous orders, although there have been great contributions in recent decades.
Keywords: Invisible hand, social cooperation, Game Theory, Experimental Eco- nomics, Evolutionary Psychology
JEL classification: A12, C71, C92, D71, D91, H41
Resumen: Una de las principales contribuciones de la economía a las ciencias sociales, expresada en la famosa metáfora de la “mano invisible”, terminó siendo cuestionada por buena parte de los economistas. En base al supuesto de un individuo maximizador de utilidad monetaria, la cooperación social en que ésta consiste fracasaba, no era posible esperar que tuviera éxito. No obstante, recientes desarrollos en diversas áreas han brindado nuevos elemen- tos en favor de la misma, su posibilidad, su sostenibilidad en el tiempo, su extensión a grupos de mayor tamaño. En este trabajo consideraremos las con- tribuciones recientes relacionadas con este tema en Teoría de los Juegos, Economía Experimental, Psicología Evolutiva y el análisis de casos históricos que contribuyen a dilucidar la teoría y confirmar sus conceptos. Se considerará cómo estas áreas de las ciencias sociales aportan nuevos elementos para la comprensión de la cooperación social y las acciones voluntarias. Se concluye planteando que su fracaso debería, al menos, ser puesto en duda, y que hay un gran campo a desarrollar todavía en el análisis de esos órdenes espontá- neos, aunque ha habido grandes contribuciones en las últimas décadas.
Palabras clave: Mano invisible, cooperación social, teoría de juegos, economía experimental, psicología evolutiva
Clasificación JEL: A12, C71, C92, D71, D91, H41
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